Data hiding techniques for steganography, which embed secret data in multimedia imperceptibly, are useful for protecting information security. By taking advantage of the popularity of MIDI files on the Internet, a new data hiding method via MIDI files is proposed, which modifies the velocities of musical note sequences to embed secret data. Initially, musical note sequences with monotonic pitches, each consisting of at least three consecutive notes with pitches either entirely non-decreasing or entirely non-increasing, are found from an input MIDI file. Next, for each of such musical note sequences, a reference velocity is generated for each non-end note in the sequence by a linear interpolation scheme. Then, a number of data bits are embedded into each non-end note by adding the decimal value of the bits to or subtracting the value from the corresponding reference velocity value to yield a new velocity for the note. The new velocity value does not differ much from the original one and fits the velocity trend in the musical note sequence, so that the resulting stego-MIDI file does not yield abnormal note strengths and the musical expression is kept. Moreover, a melody humanization scheme is proposed for modifying the velocity values in strength-invariant MIDI channels to create data embeddability without producing unreasonable melodies. The original MIDI file size is also kept unchanged after data embedding, avoiding attracting attentions from hackers. Experimental results show the feasibility of the proposed method. Also, a comparison with five other methods show that the method has the merit of reducing the resulting melody distortion or file-size change while yielding a reasonable secret-bit embedding rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, people communicate over the Internet for various purposes, like e-mailing, e-commerce, fintech applications, etc. However, information security problems might arise during the communication process, leading to the developments of cryptography [1] , [2] and information hiding [3] - [12] for uses as the solutions. In this study, we investigate the latter topic of information hiding for steganography using musical instrument digital interface (MIDI) files [13] as the cover The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Yassine Maleh . medium, i.e., we study how to hide secret information into MIDI files imperceptibly by data embedding techniques to yield stego-media looking similar to the cover media for information security protection.
A musical file of the standard MIDI format contains musical and instrument-controlling data with timing information in a standard way, and is useful for information interchanges among the musical programs and devices of MIDI systems [13] - [15] . It also has the merit of using storage space efficiently for file keeping, i.e., each MIDI file needs a relatively small file size to save the commands for controlling MIDI devices, and this is in contrast with using an audio file to keep the signals of a music, which usually need a relatively larger storage. Therefore, MIDI files are popular today for uses in music production, mobile phone applications, computer games, etc. Fig. 1 illustrates an information hiding system via the use of a MIDI file, which includes a secret embedding process and a secret extraction one. Specifically, in the secret embedding process, the given secret information is embedded into a cover MIDI file [13] to become a stego-MIDI file which may be kept or transmitted to prevent attacks from hackers. In the secret extraction process, the stego-MIDI file is taken as the input, and a reverse of the secret embedding process is conducted to extract the hidden secret information.
MIDI systems use messages as commands to achieve communication between devices for playing pieces of music. There are two types of MIDI message, namely, channel message and system message [13] . An example of channel messages is note on, defined for starting the play of a musical note. A note-on message includes three parameters, namely, channel number, note number, and velocity, where (i) the channel number specifies a MIDI channel with its value ranging from 0 through 15 (appearing to be 1 through 16 in the MIDI interface or on the instrument panel); (ii) the note number specifies the pitch of the musical note with its value ranging from 0 through 127, where 127 means the highest pitch; and (iii) the velocity specifies the force strength to play the musical note in order to create a desired audio volume with its value ranging from 0 through 127, where 127 means the largest strength. Another typical channel message, opposite to the note-on one, is note off, defined for stopping the play of a musical note. A note-off message has as well the three parameters of channel number, note number, and velocity, except that the velocity value indicates how quickly the note should be released.
The command used in the MIDI file for controlling the musical instrument to play music is called event. A type of event is the MIDI event which may be a channel message. Also, one important parameter for use in the MIDI file [13] is delta time, which is placed before every event. The value of a delta time specifies the time duration between two events, i.e., the time to wait before processing the next event. The unit of the delta time is called tick.
Only a few investigations of information hiding via MIDI files can be found in the literature [16] - [23] . Some of them insert new events into MIDI files that can be ignored by MIDI instruments, or reorganize the messages in MIDI files without altering the musical expressions [16] - [19] . In the MIDI specification, the parameter program number specifies a certain musical instrument, and an event which alternates the program number in a channel is called a program change event. John [16] proposed a method to hide encoded secret bits by adding extra program change events in front of an existing one in a MIDI file. It is noted that only the last program change event in the resulting event sequence will function.
Next, in the MIDI file a pitch bend event is used for slightly shifting the pitch of sounds being played on a given channel, and the information of the amount of shifting relative to the standard pitch of sounds is placed in the two data bytes of the event. Based on this property, Miyata et al. [17] proposed a method to hide secret information by using pitch bend events twice in succession and setting the delta time value between the two events to be zero. The first pitch bend event will not function in this way, and only the second will affect the pitch of the sounds. Secret data can so be embedded in the data bytes of the first pitch bend event, and the audience will notice no change of the played sound.
Furthermore, whenever a channel message is sent to or received from a MIDI instrument, a status byte, called the running status of the message, will be recorded by the instrument [13] . Subsequently, when another message with its running status identical to that of the previous message is sent, the running-status byte will be omitted to reduce the data transmission time according to the MIDI specification. When a MIDI instrument receives a channel message with such a status-byte omission, it will restore the omitted status byte to be the previously-recorded running status. Adli and Nakao [18] utilized this scheme of running-status omission and restoration to embed the secret bits of '0' and '1,' respectively. Finally, if all the delta time values in a series of noteon and note-off events in a MIDI file are zero, then all the events in the series are actually performed simultaneously. And the notes in such a series are called simulnotes. Inoue and Matsumoto [19] used such simulnotes to embed secret data by reordering the events in the series to encode data bits. Some other studies [20] - [22] explored information hiding via MIDI files by modifying the durations of musical notes. The duration of a note is the length of time the note is played. A note starts sounding when a MIDI device processes a note-on event of the note, and stops sounding when the device processes a note-off event of the same note. Also, as mentioned previously a delta time is the duration between an event and its preceding one, and the duration of a note is just the accumulation of all the delta times between the note-on events and the note-off ones of the note. One duration-modifying method for data hiding was proposed by Yamamoto and Iwakiri [20] , in which secret bits are embedded into the small fluctuations of note durations by dividing the notes into segments and computing the standard deviation of all the note durations in each segment to determine the number of bits embeddable into each note duration. Another durationmodifying method proposed by Adli et al. [21] embeds one secret bit into the durations of two consecutive notes by using a note duration modulation scheme which adds a small value to the duration of the first note-on event and subtracts the same value from the duration of the second note-on event to embed a secret bit of '0,' or does the reverse to embed a secret bit of '1.' Wu and Chen [22] used every two adjacent non-zero delta time values as a pair for secret embedding. Specifically, the division value, which is the number of ticks per quarter note and is in a direct proportion ratio to the delta time value, in a MIDI file is shifted to the left for a fixed number N of bits, and all the delta time values in the file are shifted similarly. Then, N secret bits with decimal value d are embedded into each delta-time pair (t 1 , t 2 ) by increasing t 1 by d and decreasing t 2 by d. In this way, the total length of the delta times of each delta-time pair can be preserved to keep the performance of the music unaltered.
A third group of methods [18] , [21] , [23] perform secret data hiding via MIDI files by modifying the velocity values of musical notes. Adli and Nakao [18] adopted such an approach by replacing the least significant bits (LSBs) of the velocity values with secret bits. The more bits are replaced, the more information is hidden. Though this creates some changes in the sound, the resulting performance can be tolerated if no more than three LSBs in each velocity value are replaced. Adli et al. [21] used a note and the closest subsequent note with the same velocity value as a pair to embed one secret bit by adding a small value to the velocity of the first note-on event and subtracting the same value from that of the second. Vaske et al. [23] used the velocity of the first note in each track of a MIDI file as a reference value r, and embedded one secret bit into each subsequent note in the track by setting the note's velocity value to r + 1 or r − 1 according to whether the secret bit is '1' or '0', respectively.
By the way, it is worth mentioning the difference between data hiding methods using audio files [24] , [25] and those methods using MIDI files [16] - [23] . Basically, as shown in Fig. 2 , data hiding methods using audio files are based on manipulations of various features of audio signals or their wave transforms, like wave shape, phase, frequency, spread spectrum, etc. to embed message data, while data hiding methods using MIDI files embed message data in MIDI events mainly via their parameters of pitch (musical note), velocity (volume strength), delta time (inter-event duration), status (operation of a MIDI instrument), etc.
In this paper, a new data hiding method via MIDI files is proposed, which can embed secret data into and extract them from musical note sequences with non-decreasing or non-increasing pitches existing in musical melodies in MIDI files. The aim is to keep the original melody velocity trend unchanged. It is noted by the way that all the previouslyreviewed methods do not consider this aim. Each musical note sequence of the mentioned property, called a monotonic note sequence in this study, consists of at least three consecutive notes with their pitches either entirely non-decreasing or entirely non-increasing. Also, a reference velocity, whose value lies between the velocity values of the two end notes (i.e., the first and the last notes) of the note sequence, is generated by a linear interpolation scheme for each non-end note in the sequence. Then, for each non-end note, depending on the absolute difference value between the note's velocity and its reference velocity, a number of data bits are embedded into the note by adding the corresponding decimal value of the secret bits to, or subtracting it from, the reference velocity value to yield a new velocity value for the note. This new velocity value lies between the original velocity value of the note and its reference velocity value, incurring only a little value change and fitting the velocity trend in the note sequence. The resulting stego-MIDI file so can be performed with unnoticeable strength distortions. In addition, a melody humanization process is conducted, which modifies the velocity values in any strength-invariant channel in the MIDI file to create data embeddability without producing unreasonable changes of note strengths. Finally, a secret extraction process, which is a reverse of the secret embedding process, is also proposed. Experimental results were conducted to show feasibility of the proposed method.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The secret embedding process and the melody humanization scheme of the proposed information hiding method are described in Section II. In Section III, the proposed secret data extraction process and a proof of the correctness of the extracted data are presented. The experimental results conducted in this study to show the feasibility of the proposed method are described in Section IV. Finally, some concluding remarks and discussions about the merits of the proposed method are included in Section V.
II. PROPOSED METHOD FOR INFORMATION HIDING VIA MIDI FILES
In this section, after a further review of MIDI file properties, the data embedding process and the melody humanization scheme of the proposed method are presented.
A. A FURTHER REVIEW OF MIDI FILE PROPERTIES
A MIDI message consists of a status byte and several data bytes. The status byte indicates the type of the transmitted message, followed by the data bytes of the related information. Different MIDI messages have different numbers of data bytes. There is only one status byte, but the data bytes may be multiple, including none. The status byte and data bytes can be distinguished by their most significant bits (MSBs). The MSB of a status byte is 1, and that of a data byte is 0. For example, the note-on message generated from pressing a key of a keyboard contains one status byte and two data bytes. The four high bits of the status byte indicate the message type of note-on, and the four low bits indicate the channel used. Messages can be transmitted through channels 1 through 16 in a MIDI device (numbered 0 through 15 in the MIDI specification). In addition, the information of the first data byte indicates, by the use of a note number, which note is pressed, while the information of the second data byte indicates the velocity of the pressed note. An example is shown in Fig. 3 , where the values of the status byte, the first data byte, and the second data byte are 93 16 , 3C 16 , and 68 16 , respectively, which represent the fact that a center C is pressed, the velocity value of pressing is 100, and the message is transmitted via channel 4.
Each MIDI file is composed of two types of chunks, namely, header chunk and track chunk. A single header chunk appears at the beginning of the MIDI file, followed by one or more track chunks. The header chunk is used to store the format, track number, and other important information of the MIDI file, while the track chunks are used to store the information related to the events of playing music, such as played musical instruments, rhythms, note velocity values, and so on.
B. PROPOSED DATA EMBEDDING PROCESS
The proposed process for embedding secret information in a MIDI file is described in this section. The channels in each track chunk of the MIDI file are processed one by one for data embedding until the secret information is embedded completely. For this, the musical notes in each channel are scanned sequentially; and starting from each scanned note, the longest monotonic note sequence with non-decreasing or non-increasing pitches in the channel is detected for subsequent secret-bit embedding. Such a sequence will be called the longest monotonically ascending note sequence (abbreviated as LMANS) or the longest monotonically descending note sequence (abbreviated as LMDNS) of the note henceforth. In other words, an LMANS L starting from a note o m has the property that for any pair of notes o x and o y in L with respective pitches p x and p y where x < y, it is always true that p x ≤ p y . An LMDNS is defined similarly but reversely. Both the LMANS and the LMDNS are called a monotonic note sequence in this study as mentioned previously. By the way, it is noted that pitches p x and p y are also called note numbers in the MIDI specification.
For example, the first four LMANS's or LMDNS's which can be found in an initial part of the German folk song entitled ''Hänschen klein'' (''Little Hans'' in English) are shown in Fig. 4 , where the note sequences labeled by x and z are LMDNS's, and those labeled by y and { are LMANS's.
Next, in each detected LMANS or LMDNS L which has at least three notes with its first note o m and last one o n having different pitches, each non-end note o k in L between o m and o n is checked sequentially by the proposed process to decide whether or not data bits can be embedded in the velocity of o k , and how many bits can be embedded there. For example, note sequences x, z, and { in Fig. 4 have three, four, and eight notes, respectively; therefore, one, two, and six notes in them, respectively, are examined one by one for deciding whether or not their velocity values can be used to embed data bits. On the contrary, note sequence y has only two notes, and is so skipped in the examination stage.
During the data embedding stage of the proposed process, at first as illustrated by Fig. 5 , a reference velocityv k is computed by linear interpolation as follows for each checked note o k between the two end notes o m and o n in L in terms VOLUME 7, 2019 
where round(·) is the nearest integer function with the real number as the input. Then, an appropriate number of bits are embedded into v k by modifying the value of v k to yield a new value which lies in the range between v k andv k . Specifically, the number of data bits, denoted as N k , which can be embedded in the original velocity v k of o k is computed in terms ofv k and v k to be
by the proposed method where · is the integer floor function. The value N k will be called the number of embeddable bits of o k hereafter. Example 1 (Creating a Secret Bitstream to Be Embedded (Part 1)): Assume that the original velocity v k and the reference velocityv k of a non-end note o k are 59 and 50, respectively. Then, according to (2) , the number N k of embeddable bits of o k is computed to be
Depending on the value of N k = log 2 ( v k −v k + 1) , the proposed method performs secret-bit embedding for one of the following three cases: (A) if N k = 0 (i.e., if no space is found for embedding), then skip note o k without embedding any information; (B) if N k > T where T is a preselected threshold value (i.e., if the difference between the reference velocityv k and the original one v k is too large), then keep the velocity of note o k unchanged without embedding any information (in order not to change the original musical expression of the note too much); (C) if 1 ≤ N k ≤ T , then conduct the following four steps in order: (C.1) take N k − 1 secret bits sequentially from the input secret bitstream; (C.2) pad the secret bits with a leading bit of '1,' called the identifier bit, to create an N k -bit stream; (C.3) transform the resulting bit stream into a decimal value s, and (C.4) embed s into the velocity v k of o k to obtain a new velocity v k by the following way using the reference velocityv k and the decimal value s:
Note that only N k − 1 secret bits instead of N k ones are embedded into the velocity of o k actually.
Example 2 (Creating a Secret Bitstream to Be Embedded (Part 2) (Example 1 Continued)): Continuing Example 1 mentioned previously, we have N k = 3 with v k and v k of note o k being 59 and 50, respectively; and by Step (C.1) above, N k −1 = 3−1 = 2, meaning that only 2 secret bits can be embedded into v k . Assume that the 2-bit secret bitstream to be embedded is '01.' Then, after it is padded with an identifier bit '1,' a 3-bit bitstream '101' is created with decimal value 5.
The detail of the proposed secret data embedding process is described as an algorithm as follows. It is assumed that there are enough track chunks in the input MIDI file to embed the input secret bitstream denoted as M . Also assumed is that the length λ of M , when transformed into a binary value λ', called the binary length of M , has at most w bits. By the way, it is noted again that the aforementioned threshold T is preselected to prevent the proposed secret-bit embedding process from resulting a stego-MIDI file which causes intolerable distortion to the expression of the original music.
Algorithm 1 (Secret Data Embedding):
Input: A cover MIDI file C with N track chunks and a secret bitstream M of length λ, where (a) the i-th track chunk in C is denoted as t i ; (b) the j-th channel in t i is denoted as c ij ; (c) the number of notes in c ij is denoted as T ij ; (d) the k-th note in c ij is denoted as o k ij ; (e) the velocity of o k ij is denoted as v k ij ; (f) the pitch (note number) of o k ij is denoted as p k ij . Output: A stego-MIDI file S resulting from embedding M in C.
(Initialization)
Step 1: Transform the length λ of the input secret bitstream M into its binary version λ', say with q bits; and if q ≤ w where w is the assumed maximum number of bits in λ', then pad the binary length λ' with an appropriate number of leading 0's to create a new but equal-valued binary length, still denoted as λ', with exactly w bits.
(Stage 1: embedding the w bits of the binary length λ of the input secret bitstream M)
Step 2: Take an unprocessed track chunk t i of the cover MIDI file C and embed the unprocessed bits of λ' into t i by the following steps. Step 2.1: Take an unprocessed channel c ij of t i and embed the unprocessed bits of λ' into c ij by the following steps. Step 2.1.1: Define m as the index of the currently processed note and set m = 1.
Step 2.1.2: Starting from the m-th note o m ij in c ij , detect the LMANS L a in c ij whose last note o n a ij is the n a -th one in c ij with n a satisfying
Step 2.1.3: Perform the same operations as those in the last step except that the LMDNS L d in c ij instead is detected, whose last note o n d ij is the n d -th note in c ij with n d satisfying
Step 2.1.4: Take n b to be the larger of the two values n a and n d , and denote the note sequence, L a or L d , corresponding to n b as L b . Step 2.1.5: Perform the operations of one of the following two cases according to the values of n b and m.
ij (i.e., if the two end notes in L b have equal pitches), then do nothing (i.e., ignore the found note sequence L b ) and go to Step 2.1.6.
, if there are at least three notes in L b , and the two end notes in L b do not have equal pitches), then for k = m + 1 through n b − 1 (i.e., for all non-end notes in L b ), perform the following steps to embed an appropriate number of unprocessed bits of λ' into the velocity of each note 
where round(·) is the nearest integer function. 
where · is the integer floor function. to form a bitstream with N k ij -1 bits and denote it as B as well.
(ii) Pad B with a leading identifier bit of '1,' transform the resulting bitstream to be a decimal value s, and embed s into the velocity v k ij of o k ij by the following way to yield a new velocity value v k ij for o k ij : Step 2 to use another unprocessed track chunk in MIDI file C to embed the remaining bits of λ'.
(Stage 2: embedding the λ bits of secret bitstream M)
Step 3: Embed secret bitstream M into MIDI file C, starting at the next unprocessed LMANS or LMDNS which can be found in the lastly processed channel in the lastly processed track chunk, or in the next unprocessed channel in the lastly processed track chunk, or in the next unprocessed track chunk, resulting from Stage 1 above, by performing operations similar to all of those in Step 2 above except that instead of embedding the w bits of the binary length λ' of M , the λ secret bits of M itself are embedded.
Step 4: Take the resulting MIDI file from the last step as the desired stego-MIDI file S and exit. Shown in Table 1 is an example of experimental results yielded by Algorithm 1 with the input MIDI file being the music entitled ''Symphony No. 5 in C minor Op. 67'' by Lugwig van Beethoven. From the table, it can be seen that totally 13 channels of different music instruments are used for secret embedding. From the last row of the table, it can be seen that the percentage of notes which were used to embed secret data is 653/2118 ≈ 30.83%, i.e., about one third of the notes in the music are used for secret embedding. It is noted that there exist only 86 simulnotes out of the 2118 notes. That is, all the notes except these 86 simulnotes are played singly.
It is not difficult to figure out that if there exist lots of simulnotes in a music, which come mainly from chords, then it is not easy to find LMANS's or LMDNS's for secret-bit embedding. An example of such a kind of MIDI music is ''Polonaise in A, Op. 40 No. 3, Military'' by Frederic Chopin, which is performed by two hands on a piano. The melody played by either hand is recorded in an individual channel. A portion of the sheet music is shown in Fig. 6 in which many chords with simulnotes can be seen. The experimental result of running Algorithm 1 with this MIDI file as the input is shown in Table 2 , from which we can see that the percentage of notes which were used to embed information is very low, only 3.79%. A conclusion drawn from these discussions is that to increase the secret-bit embedding rate using the proposed data embedding algorithm (Algorithm 1), MIDI files with few simulnotes in the melodies should be selected.
An illustration of the notes and corresponding velocity values of a third example of the experimental results of this study is shown in Fig. 7 , which was yielded by Algorithm 1 using as the input a channel of a MIDI music entitled ''Un Sospiro'' by Franz Liszt performed on an acoustic grand piano. The threshold T mentioned in Algorithm 1 is set to be 6. From the figure, we can see that totally four LMANS's or LMDNS's are detected in the first 29 notes of the channel. Totally five (6) in Algorithm 1. As shown in the figure, the new velocity value of each note (shown by the dotted line) after secret-bit embedding still lies in the range between its original velocity value and the corresponding reference velocity value (shown by the black solid line and the gray dashed line, respectively), indicating the fact that the strength trend of the performance of the original music melody is kept.
C. MELODY HUMANIZATION FOR SECRET EMBEDDING
The above algorithm for secret-bit embedding has a weakness which is not difficult to figure out. That is, when a musical melody recorded in a MIDI channel has no strength variation (i.e., when all the notes of the channel have identical velocity values), no secret bit can be embedded into the channel. The reason is that the linear interpolation operation in Algorithm 1 will yield, for each note, a reference velocity value which equals that of the original velocity, and so the difference value between the reference velocity and the original one will become zero so that no secret bit can be embedded into the note.
Some MIDI files have above-mentioned strength-invariant channels, in which the melodies are possibly created 'mechanically' in the post-production stage by MIDI editing software for the purpose of providing accompaniments to the main melody. This contrasts with the 'humanized' musical melody created by the human being, which has natural strength variations coming from an instable manual performance or from a performance with intended strength variations to express the performer's mood.
There exist methods [26] , [27] for 'humanizing' strengthinvariant channels to make the resulting MIDI melody to sound more like one performed by human hands. The major steps are just to 'randomize' the values of the parameters, like velocity, duration, start, etc., of the musical notes in the MIDI file. In this study, we propose a new melody humanization scheme from the viewpoint of promoting secret-bit embedding. The essence of the scheme is to generate by linear interpolation for each channel a temporary velocity value for each note in the channel based on the pitch value of the note and the highest and lowest pitch values of the channel. This temporary velocity value is similar to the reference velocity value generated in Algorithm 1 for each non-end note in a monotonic note sequence. The temporary value is then modified further by adding to or subtracting from it a random value, and the result is finally taken to replace the original velocity value of the note. The details of the proposed melody humanization scheme are described as an algorithm in the following.
It is noted by the way that the input MIDI file into Algorithm 1 now is assumed to be the output of Algorithm 2, i.e., assumed to be a 'humanized' MIDI file.
Algorithm 2 (Identifying Strength-Invariance Channels and Conducting Velocity Humanization):
Input: A cover MIDI file C with N track chunks, where (a) the i-th track chunk in C is denoted as t i ; (b) the j-th channel in t i is denoted as c ij ; (c) the number of notes in c ij is denoted as T ij ; (d) the k-th note in c ij is denoted as o k ij ; (e) the velocity of o k ij is denoted as v k ij ; (f) the pitch (note number) of o k ij is denoted as p k ij . Output: A MIDI file S resulting from 'humanizing' the input cover MIDI file C.
(Stage 1: identifying strength-invariance channels)
Step 1: For each track chunk t i i = 1, 2, . . . , n, perform the following steps. 1.1 For each channel c ij , j = 1, 2, ..., 16, perform the following steps. 1.1.1 Find the highest and lowest pitches (i.e., the largest and the smallest note numbers) pmax ij and pmin ij , respectively, in c ij , i. e., find 
Step 2: Take the processed MIDI file as the desired MIDI file S and exit.
III. SECRET DATA EXTRACTION FROM STEG-MIDI FILES
In this section the proposed data extraction process is described, and the correctness of the extracted secret bits is proved. Some discussions and an illustrative example are also included.
A. PROPOSED SECRET DATA EXTRACTION PROCESS
The proposed secret data extraction process is essentially a reverse version of the proposed secret data embedding process (Algorithm 1), as described in the following algorithm.
Recall the assumption mentioned previously that the binary length of the embedded secret bitstream M has at most w bits.
Algorithm 3 (Secret Data Extraction From a Stego-MIDI File):
Input: A stego-MIDI file S with N track chunks, where (a) the i-th track chunk in S is denoted as t i ; (b) the j-th channel in t i is denoted as c ij ; (c) the number of notes in c ij is denoted as T ij ; (d) the k-th note in c ij is denoted as o k ij ; (e) the velocity of o k ij is denoted as v k ij ; (f) the pitch (note number) of o k ij is denoted as p k ij . Output: A secret bitstream M resulting from extracting the secret data embedded in S.
(Stage 1: extracting the w bits of the binary length of the embedded bitstream M)
Step 1: Let ' be a w-bit stream, initially being empty, which represents the binary length of the embedded secret bitstream M ; and let c denote a counter with an initial value of 0.
Step 2: Take an unprocessed track chunk t i of stego-MIDI file S to extract the w bits of ' from S by performing the following steps. Step 2.1: Take an unprocessed channel c ij of t i to extract the subsequent bits of ' from c ij by the following steps. 
(d) Compute the smallest number N k ij of bits to represent d k ij as
where · is the integer floor function; and take N k ij to be the number of bits which presumably were embedded in Step 2.1.2 to process next LMANS or LMDNS which can be detected; else, continue. Step 2.2: If the channels of track chunk t i are not exhausted yet, then go to Step 2.1 to use another unprocessed channel to extract more bits for use as the subsequent bits of '; else, go to Step 2 to use another unprocessed track chunk in S to extract more bits for use as the subsequent bits of '.
(Stage 2: extracting the bits of the secret bitstream M)
Step 3: Transform the extracted w-bit bitstream ' into a decimal value λ and take it as the length of the secret bitstream M to be extracted.
Step 4: Extract the secret bitstream M itself from the input MIDI file S, starting at the next unprocessed LMANS or LMDNS which can be found in the lastly processed channel in the lastly processed track chunk, or at the next unprocessed channel in the lastly processed track chunk, or at the next unprocessed track chunk resulting from Stage 1 above, by performing operations similar to all of those in Step 1 through Step 2 above except that the w bits of ' dealt with there are now replaced by the bits of M .
Step 5: Take the final M as the desired secret bitstream and exit.
B. PROOF OF CORRECTNESS OF EXTRACTED SECRET DATA
It is noted that the reference velocityv k ij of o k ij , which is computed according to (9) mentioned in the above data extraction algorithm, is the same as that of the reference velocitŷ v k ij which was computed according to (6) mentioned in the data embedding process described by Algorithm 1. That is, we havev k ij =v k ij . This equality is true due to the following two observations:
(A) the velocity values of v m ij and v n b ij of the two end notes of every found LMANS or LMDNS were not changed in the data embedding process (Algorithm 1); and (B) all pitches used in (6) in Algorithm 1 for computinĝ v k ij of o k ij are the same as those in (9) in Algorithm 3 for computingv k ij of o k ij . The above fact that the reference velocity values computed in the data embedding process are identical to those computed in the extraction process indicates the nature of blindness the proposed data hiding method, meaning that the reference velocity values need not be transmitted to the legal receiver site.
On the contrary, since the original velocity v k ij of each note o k ij has been modified in the data embedding process (becoming the modified value v k ij in (8) in Algorithm 1) and is used directly in the data extraction process without being restored back to its original value (as can be seen from (10) in Algorithm 3), the proposed data hiding method is irreversible in nature.
Furthermore, in Algorithm 1 a secret bitstream with N k ij − 1 bits is always padded with a leading identifier bit '1' to become an N k ij -bit bitstream (see Step 2.1.5(B)(d)(II) in Algorithm 1) which is then embedded into the velocity v k ij of a note o k ij to obtain a new velocity v k ij by utilizing the reference velocityv k ij and the original one v k ij according to (8) in Algorithm 1. The identifier bit plays an important role to identify the value of N k ij − 1 in the data extraction process described above. To see this, recall the case of Example 1 shown previously where the new velocity v k ij of o k ij , after embedding of the bitstream of '101' which includes an identifier bit of '1' followed by a 2-bit secret bitstream '01,' becomes 55 which results from adding the decimal value 5 of '101' to the reference velocity 50. If the proposed data embedding process described by Algorithm 1 did not use the identifier bit of '1' in the way as just mentioned, the value of v k ij would become just 51, instead of 55, which results from adding 1, the decimal value of the actual secret bitstream '01,' to the reference velocity value 50. Then, during the process of data exaction described by Algorithm 3, the absolute difference between v k ij andv k ij will become |51 − 50|, or equivalently, 1 due to the reason that the reference velocitŷ v k ij of note o k ij remains unchanged in the data extraction process as mentioned previously. This will then result in a difficulty of telling whether the embedded bitstream was '1,' '01,' '001,' or else, all with an identical equivalent decimal value of 1. On the contrary, the proposed data embedding process described by Algorithm 1 above pads the actual secret bitstream with an identifier bit '1' for clearly identifying the starting position in front of the actual secret bitstream in the embedded bitstream '101.' The identifier bit can keep all the bits of the actual secret bitstream possibly with leading zeros unambiguous when the representation of the actual secret bitstream is transformed from decimal to binary.
Finally, in Algorithm 3 the smallest number N k ij of bits to represent 'the embedded bitstream with a leading identifier bit of '1' is computed by the equation
which is a combination of (10) and (11) in Algorithm 3. This equation is different in form from the corresponding one
which appears in Algorithm 1 and is repeated here. However, it can be proved that the equality N k ij = N k ij can be derived from the two equations (7) and (12) as shown in the following.
Firstly, in the secret-bit embedding process described by Algorithm 1, the number of bits embedded into the velocity of note o k ij is described by (7) above. Secondly, according to (8) , the new velocity v k ij of note o k ij is computed as v k ij =v k ij ± s in order to embed the decimal value s of the bitstream composed of a leading identifier bit '1' followed by N k ij − 1 secret bits. This means that we have
On the other hand, in the secret-bit extraction process described by Algorithm 3, the number of bits extracted from the velocity of note o k ij is described by (12) above, and as mentioned previously in the observation of (B) above, the reference velocity values computed in the secret embedding and extraction processes are identical, i.e., we havev k ij =v k ij . Therefore, substitutingv k ij in (12) byv k ij , we get
Combining (13) and (14) above leads to
Since s is the decimal value of the N k ij -bit bitstream composed of a leading identifier bit '1' followed by N k ij − 1 secret bits as mentioned previously, it can be figured out that the value of s ranges from 2 N k ij −1 to 2 N k ij − 1, so that according to (15) , we can derive the following inequalities
Taking into consideration the effects of the operations of the binary log function log 2 (·) and the floor integer function · , the above inequalities may be reduced to be
which implies the following desired equality:
Done. That is, the number, N k ij , of bits embedded in the secret embedding process is identical to the number, N k ij , of bits extracted in the secret extraction process.
The proof of N k ij = N k ij may also be accomplished by firstly listing exhaustively all possible corresponding values computed respectively by (7) and (12) for deriving N k ij and N k ij , respectively, and then checking the equality of every pair of corresponding values, as shown by Table 3 . In particular, the original velocity v for a note is listed in the first column in a way of specifying its value with respective to the reference valuev. For example, v =v − 63tov − 126 appearing in the entry of the first column and the second row of the table means that the absolute difference v −v between v andv lies in the range from 63 to 126. For this particular case, the number N of embedded bits computed by Algorithm 1 is log 2 ( v −v + 1) = 6 (see Column 2) while the number N of extracted bits computed by Algorithm 3 is log 2 v −v + 1 = 6 as well (see Column 6), as can be judged from the intermediate data shown in the entries of Columns 3 to 5. In short, the entry data of all the rows of the table show that N = N for all possible cases of velocity values.
Example 3 (Extracting the Embedded Secret-Bit Stream Created in Examples 1 and 2 (by Algorithm 3)): As a continuation of Examples 1 and 2 to illustrate the corresponding secret-bit extraction situation, we have the reference velocityv k of note o k remaining unchanged, which is 50. Also, the velocity v k of o k is 55. Then, the absolute difference d k TABLE 3. The original velocity corresponding to the reference velocityv and the related information about the numbers of embedded and extracted secret bits obtained in the data embedding and extraction processes.
between v k andv k is |v k −v k | = 5. Therefore, the number of bits extracted by Algorithm 3 is computed to be
And so the N k -bit stream of the decimal value 5 of d k is the three bits of '101.' Finally, after excluding the leading identifier bit '1,' the actually (N k − 1)-bit secret bitstream extracted is taken to be the two bits '01,' as desired. Table 3 )): We may also repeat the last example by utilizing the data shown in Table 3 . In the secret-bit extraction process, we know that the velocity value v and the corresponding reference velocity valuev are 55 and 50, respectively, as mentioned above. The former is larger than the latter by a value of 5. This means that s = v −v = 5 = 101 2 . Also, it is seen that the value 5 lies in the range of 4 to 7 which appears in the entry at Column 5 and Row 11 of Table 3 (not in the entry at Column 5 and Row 5 because v >v ). Therefore, the data of Row 11 may be used to get the number of extracted bits (including the leading identifier bit '1') to be 3 (seen from Column 6), the actual number of secret bits embedded to be 2 (seen from Column 3), and finally the extracted secret bits to be '01' which are the tailing two bits of the binary form '101' of s.
Example 4 (Extracting the Embedded Secret-Bit Stream Created in Examples 1 and 2 (by

IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In the experiments conducted in this study, ten MIDI files were used as the tested cover files. They are classified into two categories: one being classical music, and the other popular music including cartoon songs, TV drama theme songs, and pop songs. Algorithms 1 through 3 are applied to these files to see the effects of the proposed processes of secret embedding, melody humanization, and secret extraction.
A. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS OF SECRET-BIT EMBEDDING
Some information of the cover MIDI files is shown in Table 4 , in which the columns with the headings of No. of LMANS's and No. of LMDNS's specify respectively the numbers of LMANS's and LMDNS's found by Algorithm 1, each of which has at least three notes. It is such kinds of monotonic note sequences that can be used for secret data embedding. The column with the heading of No. of Embeddable Notes specifies the number of notes, into each of which at least one bit can be embedded. Such notes are called embeddable notes. It is mentioned again that the proposed secret-bit embedding process pads a secret bitstream with a leading identifier bit '1' before the bitstream is embedded into the velocity of a note. If the number of embeddable bits (defined in Section II.B) of an embeddable note is just one, it means that the embedded information does not contain any secret bit but only the identifier bit. The percentages of various numbers of embeddable bits in the embeddable notes of the tested files are shown in Fig. 8 , from which it can be seen that the melodies have great differences in their secret data embedding capabilities, implying that MIDI files with larger data embedding capabilities should be selected for secret hiding.
The numbers of secret bits that can really be embedded into each file, each called the number of embedded secret bits hereafter, using Algorithm 1 for all cases of using different values of threshold T are shown in Table 5 . The maxima of such numbers of the files are found to appear when T = 6. On the contrarily, when threshold T is set to be 1, no secret bit can be embedded, as can be seen from Step 2.1.5 in Algorithm 1. The number of embedded secret bits and the number of embedded secret bits per note in the tested files using Algorithm 1 for cases of using different values of threshold T. Therefore, the column for threshold T = 1 is not listed in Table 5 .
Also shown in Table 5 is the number of embedded secret bits 'per note' of each tested file for every value of T . This number is computed as the ratio N b /A of the number N b of embedded secret bits in the file (appearing in the left column of the two columns for each T in Table 5 ) over the respective total number A of both embeddable and non-embeddable notes (appearing in Column 4 of Table 4 and repeated in Column 3 in Table 5 ) in the file. Finally, the average number of embedded secret bits per note of all the tested files for each T is also shown in the last row of Table 5 . As can be seen, this average number ranges from 0.08 to 0.55 as T increases from 2 to 6. By the way, according to Table 5 , the MIDI file entitled ''Lambada'' has the largest secret embedding capability of 4400 bits (equivalent to 550 ASCII characters) when T = 5 or 6. This means that when appropriate MIDI melodies are selected, large numbers of secret bits can be embedded into them. Also, the threshold T should be selected to be as large as possible to enlarge the secret embedding capability of the MIDI file as long as the resulting music expression is not distorted.
B. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS OF MELODY HUMANIZATION AND SECRET-BIT EMBEDDING
If MIDI files contain strength-invariant channels, it will result in lower secret-bit embedding rates as mentioned previously in Section II.C. Table 6 shows some statistics of five of the ten tested MIDI files which include some strength-invariant channels. From the last column of the table, it can be observed that a large portion of the notes in these channels have invariant velocity values. In some further experiments conducted in this study, the above five MIDI files were tested using the melody humanization algorithm, Algorithm 2, as a preprocessing step for cases of using different values of threshold T with the extension parameter value m = 6 and the humanization parameter value H = 8 before Algorithm 1 is applied. Then, after Algorithm 2 and 1 were applied in order, the numbers of embedded secret bits are increased as shown in Table 8 , as compared with Table 7 which lists the same  TABLE 7 . The number of embedded secret bits and the number of embedded secret bits per note of each of five of the ten tested files with strength-invariant channels, yielded by applying Algorithm 1 to cases of using different values of threshold T. TABLE 8. The number of embedded secret bits and the number of embedded secret bits per note of each of the five tested files in Table 7 containing strength-invariant channels, yielded by applying both Algorithms 2 and 1 in sequence to cases of different threshold values T with the extension parameter value m= 6 and the humanization parameter value H= 8.
items of data obtained without performing Algorithm 2. For example, for the case of using the first MIDI file entitled ''Lambada'' and for T = 5 or 6, the numbers of embedded secret bits without and with humanization preprocessing are 4400 and 5803, respectively, which indicate an improvement of about 32% on the secret embedding rate. Furthermore, for T = 6, the average numbers of embedded secret bits per note without and with humanization preprocessing for all the five files are 0.57 and 0.73, meaning an improvement of 28%.
C. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS FOR EVALUATING THE INFLUENCES OF VARIOUS PARAMETER VARIATIONS
The maximum numbers of embedded secret bits per note in the five tested MIDI files using the threshold value T = 6 and the extension parameter m = 6 for the six cases of conducting no preprocessing and conducting preprocessing using the five humanization parameter values of H = 0, 4, 6, 8, and 10 are shown in Fig. 9 . From the figure, it can be seen that the number of embedded secret bits per note N esb improves as H increases. For example, for the case of using the first MIDI file entitled ''Lambada,'' when no melody humanization is conducted or when H = 0 (meaning that no velocity randomization), the value N esb is 0.53; and when melody humanization is conducted, the value N esb increases to be 0.62, 0.67, 0.70, 0.74 for H = 4, 6, 8, 10, respectively. Also, the proposed secret embedding process changes the note velocity values when secret bits are embedded into the notes. To evaluate the effect of such velocity changes on the performance quality of the resulting MIDI file, some more experiments were conducted. At first, we define a measure similar to the signal to noise ratio (SNR) used often in the fields of image and audio processing, called weighted signal to noise ratio (WSNR), in the unit of dB as follows:
where N is the number of track chunks; T ij is the number of notes in the j-th channel of the i-th track chunk in each MIDI file; v k ij and v k ij are the original velocity and the modified velocity after embedding secret bits in note o k ij , respectively; and b k ij is the number of beats of note o k ij , used as a weight of the velocity of the note because the note is played for a time duration which is proportional to b k ij (a difference from the case of image processing where the weight for each pixel is the same because each pixel occupies an identical amount of space). Then, the value of the WSNR for each of the five tested MIDI files is computed after Algorithms 2 and 1 were applied in order using different humanization parameter values of H = 0, 4, 6, 8, 10 with threshold value T = 6 and extension parameter m = 6 as shown in Fig. 10 Next, in the aforementioned experimental results of melody humanization, the extension parameter m used in Algorithm 2 (see Step 1.1.4 there), which is utilized to adjust the identical velocity values in the strength-invariant channels, was set to be 6. Other values of this parameter m with threshold value T = 6 and humanization parameter value H = 8 have been tried in more experiments, and the results are shown in Figs. 11 and 12. Fig. 11 shows that no distinct secret-bit embedding effect (subject to round-off errors only) was yielded as m varies. The reason is that m is used to extend the gap between the maximum and minimum velocities so as to create strength variations according to pitch changes. This is just part of melody humanization, and does not help improving the secret-bit embedding capacity, as can be seen from the interpolation formulas (6) and (9) mentioned in FIGURE 11. The numbers of embedded secret bits per note of the five tested MIDI files with strength-invariant channels for the six cases of conducting no preprocessing and conducting preprocessing using five different extension parameter values.
FIGURE 12.
The WSNR values yielded after embedding secret bits in the five tested MIDI files with strength-invariant channels for the six cases of conducting no preprocessing as well as conducting preprocessing under five different extension parameter values. Algorithms 1 and 2, respectively. Finally, the results shown in Fig. 12 indicate that for uses of different values of the extension parameter m, including m = 0, the WSNR value decreases as the value m increases as expected after conducting the preprocessing step of melody humanization.
It is noted that in all of the above experiments, no matter whether the humanization preprocessing step (Algorithm 2) is conducted or not, the sizes of the MIDI files do not change after the data embedding process (Algorithm 1) is performed or not. This result of the proposed method can reduce the possibility of attracting attention from the hacker. It is also noted that all the secret data embedded into the ten tested files could be extracted successfully by the proposed data extraction algorithm, Algorithm 3, as shown by the experimental results mentioned previously.
It is also noted that the time complexities for the proposed secret message embedding, extraction, and humanization methods are all linear, i.e., they are all of the order of O(n)
where n is the number of notes in the input MIDI file; and the space complexities of the three methods are all of the order of O(1), i.e., the space needed by each of them is constant.
D. A COMPARISON OF PERFORMANCES WITH FIVE OTHER METHODS
We have compared our method with five other methods proposed in [18] , [21] - [23] (with two methods appearing in [21] ). The data set used as the inputs to the six methods is one of those sets used in [22] , which contains 27 MIDI melodies performed by the euphonium. The overall results of comparisons are listed in Table 9 , from which we have four observations as follows (note: the two methods in [21] are specified as [21] (a) and [21] (b)).
(A) Comparison of the parameter of bits per note (bpn) -Our method yields in average a bpn value of 0.628 which is inferior to three methods listed in the table, namely, [18] , [22] , and [23] . However, the method of [22] yields a stego-MIDI file with its size being changed after data embedding while the proposed method does not. And the two methods of [18] and [23] both do not keep the original velocity trend and so yield unnatural melodies after data embedding while the proposed method does. It is noted that both size changes and unnatural melodies of the stego-MIDI files are apt to arousing suspicions from hackers.
(B) Comparison of velocity processing effects -Four methods, namely, [18] , [21] (b), [23] and the proposed method, all change the velocities of the notes in a MIDI file. However, the former three methods all distort the velocity values in random ways, yielding possibly unnatural melodies while the proposed method yields velocity values that fit the original velocity trend, producing melodies sounding similar to the original ones.
(C) Further comparisons of the proposed method with Wu & Chen [22] -Wu and Chen [22] , which is based on delta time adjustment, will create note onset time changes (equivalent to changes of the parameter of start of the note) and note duration distortions to which human ears are sensitive. On the contrary, the proposed method does not have these weaknesses, and creates only small changes of velocity values which do not alter the original velocity trend so that the resulting melody still sound natural.
(D) Comparison of the characteristic of blindness -The proposed method is blind, and so are Adli and Nakao [18] , Wu and Chen [22] , and Vaske et al. [23] , while Adli et al. [21] (a) and Adli et al. [21] (b) are not. Note that a blind method, as mentioned previously, does not transmit the reference values used in the data embedding process at the sender site to the receiver site for data extraction.
E. DISCUSSIONS ABOUT ATTACKS TO MUSICAL VELOCITIES
The processing unit in the MIDI file is event which is not of the nature of signal, and so traditional signal processing operations are less likely to be used to attack MIDI music. On the contrary, the operations of random noise padding and quantization can indeed be performed on the velocities and durations of the notes in the MIDI file. Since the proposed method does not hide secret data into the durations of notes, attacks of random noise padding and quantization applied to the durations of notes will not affect the secret data hidden in the velocities by the proposed method. Therefore, we concentrate on attacks to the velocities of notes in the following discussions.
When an attack of random noise padding (equivalent to an extra velocity humanization operation conducted after secret data are embedded into the velocities) is applied to the velocities of notes which are processed by our method, the secret data hidden in the velocities of notes will be destroyed and cannot be extracted correctly. Similarly, quantization of the velocity values will change the hidden data in the velocities as well, leading to erroneous secret data extraction results. Furthermore, two more types of attacks can be applied to the velocities of notes, namely, decreasing or increasing the velocity values of all notes for the same amount (equivalent to in-parallel velocity shifting) and changing the contrast by changing the dispersion of the velocity values [21] . The former type of attack, in-parallel velocity shifting, will not affect the data hidden in the velocity values by the proposed method, as can be figured out, while the latter type of attack, contrast changing by velocity dispersion, will indeed destroy the data hidden by the proposed method, leading to incorrect data extraction results.
The above discussions are summarized as a table, Table 10 , in which we also mention the results of attacks to two other existing blind methods which conduct data hiding in the velocities of MIDI files, namely, Adli and Nakao [18] and Vaske et al. [23] . The table shows that the three compared velocity-related blind methods are vulnerable to attacks to the velocities of the notes in the MIDI file with three exceptions: the proposed method and Vaske et al. [23] are both resistant to the attack of in-parallel velocity shifting and the latter is in addition resistant to the attack of contrast changing by velocity dispersion. Therefore, the secret bit error ratio (BER) values resulting from attacks are not meaningful except those of the three exceptions, which are 0%, meaning that no error is incurred.
V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
A novel data hiding method via MIDI files, which embeds secret data into the monotonic note sequences of the musical melodies, is proposed for steganography in this study; and experiments proving the effectiveness of the proposed method have been conducted. At first, the monotonic note sequences, each containing at least three consecutive notes with the pitches either entirely non-decreasing or entirely non-increasing, are found from the melody of the input MIDI file. Next, the pitch and velocity values of the two end notes in each found monotonic note sequence are used to generate by linear interpolation a reference velocity for every non-end note in the note sequence. The reference velocity values fit the original velocity tendency of the note sequence. Then, the absolute difference value between the velocity of each note and its corresponding reference velocity is computed to decide the number N of embeddable bits in the note. Finally, N − 1 secret bits are embedded into the note together with a leading identifier bit. The resulting stego-MIDI file can keep the original musical expression and can be performed well with no noticeable audio distortion. With the help of identifier bits, the embedded secret bits can be extracted correctly by a secret data extraction process also proposed in this study. Furthermore, for any MIDI file with strength-invariant channels, a melody humanization scheme has been proposed additionally to change and then randomize the velocities of the music. With the humanized MIDI file as the input to the proposed secret embedding process, the secret embedding capability of the file can be improved effectively as shown by the experimental results.
Several advantages of the proposed method are worth mentioning here. Firstly, most existing methods, which modify the velocities of notes in MIDI files to hide secret messages, make the sound volume of the music to change randomly, leading to unnatural musical expressions which might cause suspicions from the audience from the viewpoint of secret hiding. On the contrary, the proposed secret-bit embedding process controls the volume changes of the musical notes to be within a reasonable range, and the resulting note velocities fit the original strength tendency in each monotonic note sequence. In this way, an abnormal note-strength performance resulting from the stego-MIDI file can be avoided. Secondly, the size of the stego-MIDI file does not change after the proposed data embedding process is conducted, and this reduces the probability of attracting attention from the hacker and increases the information security of the proposed method. These two merits increase the effect of steganography. A third merit of the proposed method is the application of a new melody humanization scheme, which includes velocity adjustment and randomization, to any strength-invariant channels in the input MIDI file before data embedding to improve the secret-bit embedding capability of the file. Furthermore, a detailed comparison of the proposed method with five existing methods was conducted, which shows that the proposed method has a medium secret-bit embedding rate; and is superior, in reducing the resulting melody distortion or file-size change, to those methods with better embedding rates than the proposed method.
